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Abstract 
 
Germany’s position of power within the European Union disguises how impacted the 
German economy was by the 2008 Financial Crisis and Europe’s subsequent Sovereign 
Debt Crisis.  Two of Germany’s major banks-Commerzbank and Bayerische 
Landesbank- suffered major losses and required emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to 
survive.  Walter Bagehot wrote the theory underpinning lenders of last resort (LLRs) in 
1873 but how has the development of systemically important banks affected the 
usefulness of Bagehot’s theory?  This paper aims to explain why Germany is in need of 
updated LLR recommendations through an analysis of the ELA Germany at large, 
Commerzbank and Bayerische Landesbank received.  It also aims to empirically prove 
the stigma and public distrust of ELA through a regression of Commerzbank’s daily 
stock returns using an augmented Fama/French model.  I find that Bagehot’s theory and 
recommendations are out of date for our current global financial sector.  I cannot 
empirically prove any stigma or public distrust of Commerzbank, there is no relationship 
between Commerzbank stock returns and the augmented Fama/French factors.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Germany has been viewed increasingly as the driving force behind the EU debt 
negotiations with good reason; Germans appear to be footing a disproportionate amount 
of the bill.  To many onlookers Germany, and German banks, escaped the Financial 
Crisis unscathed.  As Greece’s continuing debt crisis covered international news, 
Germany was consistently painted as the unsympathetic aggressor.  In everyday 
conversation it sounded like Germany did not face any obstacles to recovery, or even 
need a recovery at all.  In reality, however, Germany suffered like every other nation and 
similarly its banks also required liquidity assistance.  But how well did Germany disburse 
additional funds for liquidity assistance during this crisis? 
Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market in 
1873 in response to recent financial panics in London and the United Kingdom 
(UK).  His frequently quoted book articulates what a Lender of Last Resort (LLR) is, 
who should take on that role and what they should do in the role.  It became the standard 
theory behind LLRs despite how long ago it was written.  Using his recommendations I 
will look at how liquidity assistance was provided to Germany as a whole through the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  Taking into account the approval process for liquidity 
assistance, the type of liquidity assistance provided and, any collateral requirements, I 
will be analyzing if the ECB adhered to Bagehot’s recommendations both to the letter 
and in spirit.  Within Germany itself, many individual banks required and applied for 
liquidity assistance.  I will be looking at two specific banks: Commerzbank and 
Bayerische Landesbank to see a snapshot of how Germany provided assistance to its own 
banks.  Using the same analytic tools listed above, I will be analyzing whether Germany 
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followed Bagehot’s recommendations when providing assistance to its own banks.  These 
two banks are being chosen because of their importance to Germany’s economy and the 
scope of funds they received.  Finally, I will be running an event study on the ELA 
Commerzbank received to contextualize Bagehot’s recommendation in a modern crisis. 
Commerzbank is Germany’s second largest private bank.  It is truly global in 
scope, with numerous offshore branches, representatives in 50 countries across the globe, 
thousands of employees and over €500 billion of assets.  A bank of this size and 
importance in Germany, and the world, will greatly affect the global economy if it suffers 
from a liquidity or solvency problem.  Given the trend of increasing bank size and 
influence, and the new idea of banks being too systemically important to fail, 
Commerzbank can be seen as “too big to fail” in the German financial system.   
Bayerische Landesbank is Germany’s eighth largest financial institution and is 
now almost entirely owned by the state of Bavaria.  Bavaria has the largest economy of 
any state in Germany, making it a wealthy region.  Bayerische Landesbank holds over 
€200 billion in assets.  While Bayerische Landesbank is a private bank, its unique status 
as a Landesbank, state owned, means that the taxpayers of Bavaria can be liable for 
providing bailout funds similar to how the United States provided bailouts following 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse.  Bayerische Landesbank is a large German bank with a far-
reaching global impact.  Continued confidence in Bayerische Landesbank is important for 
the continued growth of Bavaria’s and the larger German economy. 
Not only is Germany seen as being too efficient and effective to allow its banks to 
face these situations, the conversation around systemically important banks seems to be 
primarily a U.S. conversation.  This is overwhelmingly false.  Despite Germany being a 
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major financial hub for the European and world financial system, it faced many of the 
same problems and may have given special treatment to its most influential institutions. 
 Throughout the world, central, public and private banks faced major liquidity 
crises following the bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble and the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  Europe faced an additional Sovereign Debt Crisis 
during and after the 2008 Financial Crisis; my analysis will focus on this period, 2010 to 
present.  This paper will investigate to what extent the implementation of ELA funds in 
Germany followed the recommendations presented by Walter Bagehot and whether the 
discovery of systemically important banks was relevant to the dispersal of 
funds.  Germany’s position of power in the European Union may have allowed it to 
inefficiently allocate emergency funds without following Bagehot’s recommendations 
and not face any international outcry or consequences. 
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II. Lit Review 
 
The economic literature on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and lenders of last 
resort (LLRs) is vast; a search for academic articles on JSTOR had over one hundred and 
seventy thousand results.  Unfortunately, literature on individual countries and their 
approach was more difficult to find.  The following papers have provided a strong 
starting point; the first three cover my area of interest and provide an example of 
empirical evaluation.  The fourth paper reviewed provided background on data sets for 
my empirical analysis.  The fifth and final piece of literature reviewed is Bagehot’s last 
chapter.  It is one of the foundational sources on ELA and LLRs.  Every paper I reviewed 
referenced Bagehot in some aspect and facilitates a jumping off point for my own 
analysis.   
The first paper, “Financial Crises and Bank Funding: Recent Experience in the 
Euro Area” (2013), has Adrian van Rixtel and Gabriele Gasperini arguing three main 
points.  First that banks turned towards secured liabilities, and reduced their unsecured 
liabilities and securitizations during the crisis. They argue that this is due to a change in 
what the European Central Bank and sovereign national banks would accept as collateral. 
Second, funding from sovereign central banks and the European Central Bank 
(ECB)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) was crucial in stabilizing the Euroarea during 
the height of the Financial Crisis following the failure of Lehman Brothers and again 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.  They claim that every bank in the Euroarea 
had difficulties with funding, whether in access or cost and “thus sovereign tensions 
morphed into a banking crisis”.  Without access to short term funding available in the 
market setting, banks were forced to turn to Lenders of Last Resort (LLRs).  Lenders of 
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Last Resort are where banks can find liquidity if there is none available in the market.  
They are seen as the “last resort” because that liquidity comes at a price. 
Their third argument, that funding was increasingly segmented according to bank 
nationality and that access to funding was no longer due to their credit worthiness but 
offered primarily on the basis of their country of origin.  Their most convincing data 
points for this argument were in the data for deposit funding.  Peripheral countries 
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain) suffered from deposit outflows while core countries 
(France, Germany, Netherlands and Italy) witnessed deposit inflows.  Rixtel and 
Gasperini mention that outflows from Greece, Portugal and Spain were not driven 
entirely by depositors seeking a safe haven but by depositors wanting access to funds 
during an economic downturn.  This also speaks to a lack of confidence in the stability of 
the local banking systems; depositors were worried that they will not have access to their 
funds if they are kept in their local bank.  France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands 
received an increase of €296, €265, €203 and €57 billion euros respectively.   
Despite the cause of deposit inflows and outflows, the unique structure of the EU 
meant that banks with large liquidity and funding difficulties were tied to their nation’s 
central bank for the LLR and ELA functions.  The EU required that the central bank of 
the country in question was solely responsible for providing all ELA and assumed all the 
risk for each bank within that country.  Not all countries’ central banks had the ability to 
provide liquidity to their struggling banking sector1 and forced banks to look for other 
means of funding. 
                                            
1 Any country within the European Monetary Union is no longer able to print their own 
money or create their own monetary policy.  By adopting the euro, these countries ceded 
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 Rixtel and Gasperini argue that the increased dependence on interbank borrowing 
emphasized and demonstrated the segmentation of available financing across national 
lines.  The transformation of Germany into a net lender for Euroarea banks (after being a 
consistent borrower) demonstrates that Germany was flush with funding while many 
other Euro banks (namely those Italy and Spain) were desperate for funding and were net 
borrowers.  They conclude the paper reiterating the strong connection between financial 
crises and bank funding because during periods of extreme financial turmoil access to 
funding markets becomes strained and forces all banks to find alternative funding sources 
or decrease their holdings.  They explain how this harms the overall economy and end 
with “the principle that fiscal prudence is a prerequisite for bank stability.” 
 Of the three main points made in this paper, I find the third one most interesting 
and relevant to the scope of my paper.  The first argument that banks turned towards 
securitized liabilities is well supported with empirical evidence; you see a drop in 
uncovered bonds across the Euroarea.  Their second argument, funding from LLRs and 
the ECB/IMF was crucial in stabilizing the Euroarea, is hard to dispute.  But the third 
argument, that funding was segmented across national lines, is interesting and not 
necessarily logical.  The evidence Rixtel and Gasperini present is convincing, but 
simplistic.  They ignore the number of multinational banks present in the 
Euroarea.  Many large banks may be headquartered in one Euroarea country but have 
branches, which provide loans, in multiple other countries.  They also ignore banks that 
have ownership in multiple countries.  Italian banks have subsidiaries in France; Dutch 
banks have majority ownership from German shareholders.  This paper provides a strong 
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argument for the importance of the nationality of a bank but it lacks a critical 
complication, cross-national banks. 
 
In the second paper, “Central Banks as Lenders of Last Resort: Experiences 
During the 2007-10 Crisis and Lessons for the Future”, Dietrich Domanski, Richhild 
Moessner and William Nelson (2014) review Bagehot’s classical theory of LLRs, explain 
how ELA was dispersed during the crisis and finish the paper with recommendations for 
ELA policy in the future.  The theory for LLRs centers on providing liquidity to solvent 
but illiquid banks at a penalty rate to discourage moral hazard with sufficient 
collateral.  ELA should either be provided to prevent a disorderly bankruptcy and fire 
sale or, to the market as a whole via open market operations.  The LLRs should use 
constructive ambiguity to avoid moral hazard, the LLR manages market expectations so 
no bank knows for sure if it will receive ELA and that reduces moral hazard. 
The authors then describe how ELA was given during the crisis and the many 
different institutions created to manage liquidity.  In the first phase of the crisis ELA was 
used primarily to “allow an orderly resolution of liquidity difficulties of financial 
institutions that were perceived as systemically important.”  Following the fall of Lehman 
Brothers2, they argue that ELA expanded dramatically and not always in line with the 
theory of ELA.  LLRs broadened the list of acceptable collateral, provided ELA in 
foreign currencies and extended the maturity of loans.   
                                            
2 Lehman Brothers, the large American investment bank, filled for bankruptcy on 
September 15th, 2008 after the Federal Reserve denied Lehman Brothers ELA.  Lehman 
filling for bankruptcy started the ripple effect of the Financial Crisis.  A number of 
international firms held securities interrelated to Lehman Brothers in some manner so the 
collapse and subsequent bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers caused a $737 billion decline in 
collateral for the securities lending market (Aitken & Singh, 2009). 
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Domanski et al. argue that although the practice of ELA violated the theory, the 
actions of LLRs were in the spirit of the theory.  The LLRs acted to avoid the costly 
failure of institutions and limit the risk of contagion.  Domanski et al. feel that ELA was 
often riskier than normal lending; LLRs increased moral hazard by providing ELA to 
non-traditional institutions.  Central banks needed to find new strategies to handle 
liquidity problems outside of the banking sector, the new ELA provisions required central 
banks to make tough choices about drawing boundaries and most importantly, the stigma 
associated with receiving ELA was increased. 
Domanski et al. end the paper with a review of policy changes that have been 
implemented following the crisis and a recommendation for more improvements.  New 
liquidity regulations aim to reduce the need for ELA, the perimeter of regulation has been 
increased to include institutions that can cause system-wide shocks from liquidity 
problems and new policy initiatives that internalize the effects of excessive risk-taking to 
reduce moral hazard are in the works.  The recommendations Domanski et al. make focus 
on changing the role of the central bank, using discretion for foreign currencies and, 
reducing the stigma associated with ELA. 
The major arguments made in this paper, that the LLRs followed the spirit of 
ELA theory and the policy recommendations, seems possible.  Whether the LLRs 
followed the theory of ELA as described by Bagehot, they still provided ELA to many 
institutions in a variety of ways.  But they make an interesting observation.  The 
Eurozone was able to give more ELA in a more effective manner because they had 
reduced the stigma associated with ELA.  This paper provides an unconsidered avenue 
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for further discussion: How did the Eurozone reduce stigma and was it consistent within 
and throughout countries? 
 
 The third paper, “Did Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) of the ECB Delay 
the Bankruptcy of Greek Banks?” features Martin R. Gotz, Rainer Haselmann, Jan Pieter 
Krahnen and Sascha Steffen (2015) explaining the process of receiving ELA in the 
Eurozone, examining the decision to give Greece ELA and making recommendations for 
ways to improve ELA in the Eurozone.  They lay out the conflict between the national 
central banks providing ELA but needing approval for ELA allocations from the 
European Central Bank (ECB)’s Council of Governors.  This need for approval, they 
argue, makes the decision to provide additional funding and liquidity for a country in a 
time of crisis dependent on a consensus of European policy makers.  Ultimately, they 
argue, “the assessment of a nation[al] bank’s solvency is intertwined with the decision at 
the higher level”. 
 Gotz et al. then claim that Greece was solvent according to the data they had 
available and that the ECB had no other decision than to extend the ELA until a decision 
was made at the “supra-national” level.  The main recommendation from this paper was 
the need for increased transparency and availability of Eurozone ELA data.  They argue 
that the market responds primarily to speculation because factual evidence is unavailable 
and the speculation is harmful to the market.  Gotz et al. provide a country-specific 
method of analysis for Eurozone ELA.  So despite the lack of investigable questions, this 
paper is infinitely useful to me as the main analysis of this paper is a single country. 
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The fourth paper reviewed for this thesis, “Fama/French Factors for Germany: 
Which Set is Best?” has Roman Brückner, Patrick Lehmann, Martin H. Schmidt and 
Richard Stehle discuss internet-based data sets from 6 different authors: Artmann, Finter, 
Kempf, Koch and Theissen (2012b), Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2013), Schmidt, 
Schrimpf, von Arx, Wagner and Zeigler (2011), Marmi and Poma, Frazzini and 
themselves.  In total, they analyze nine different factor set for Germany and three time 
series.  They highlight differences in makeup of the data sets, compare the datasets 
empirically and give advice on when to use which data set. 
 The factor sets differ on their data sources, the included stock exchanges, the 
breakpoints and sample selection of the portfolios, the treatment of dual class firms, the 
tax imputations system, the rate of return on the market portfolio and a few other minor 
characteristics.  There are three major data sources Stehle’s database of the Frankfurt 
stock exchange beginning in 1954, Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank (KKMDB) and 
DataStream; however, each author uses a slightly different data source.  Artmann et al. 
use KKMDB and Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienfuhrer, Brückner et al. use a number of 
sources including KKMDB and DataStream, Franzzini uses CRSP and XpressFeed 
Global, Hanauer et al. and Schmidt et al. use DataStream and Worldscope, Marmi and 
Poma use Factset. 
 The included stock exchanges for each author are predominantly the Frankfurt 
stock exchange but Franzzini’s stock exchanges are unknown and Schmidt et al.’s are 
listed as “probably all”.  The ‘Small Minus Big’ (SMB) factor is calculated by 
subtracting the rate of return on large stocks from the rate of return on small stocks, so 
the breakpoint for small and large stocks is essential.  There are three major choices, a 
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50/50 break (which Hanauer et al. and Artmann et al. use), Schmidt et al. use both 
breakpoints of 0.5 and 0.8 and Franzzini only uses a breakpoint of 0.8.  Except Hanauer 
et al., all of the factor sets reviewed use separate (typically larger) samples of stocks for 
the calculation of the market portfolio than the factor portfolios. 
 The authors review three different methods for handling the dual class of stock 
issued by firms.  The two classes, Stammaktien (common stocks) and Vorzugsaktien 
(non-voting preferred stock), can be treated as a unit, two separate observations, or only 
one type can be included.  Brückner et al. and Hanauer et al. use the first method, 
Armann et al. includes the class of stock with the longer availability of data, Schmidt et 
al., Frazzini and, Marmi and Poma remove non-voting shares.  Brückner et al. are the 
only factor set to take the corporate income tax credit into account.  All factor sets, except 
Artmann et al., calculate their own proxy for the market portfolio from their own 
sample.  Artmann et al., uses DAFOX until 2004 and the CDAX starting in 2005. 
 Following their description of the factors sets individual characteristics, the 
authors then move to compare the factor sets empirically.  They look at the number of 
observations in the portfolios, the means and standard deviations stability over time, the 
correlation coefficients and tests of means, and any economically significant 
differences.  Brückner et al. conclude the paper reviewing applications of the factor sets 
and making recommendations based on proposed use of the factor sets. 
 This paper was essential to my statistical analysis section.  Fama/French factors 
are easily available for America and there is only one factor set, but as Brückner et al. 
make clear Germany is not the same.  Brückner et al.’s in depth comparison for a number 
of factor sets was invaluable.  My major critique for this paper is that it reads often like 
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self-promotion.  They highlight a number of key differences and through their own 
analysis but they only recommend three other factor sets besides their own (two of them 
with time constraints).  The self-promotion however, was successful in this case because 
I use Brückner et al.’s factor set. 
 
The final piece of literature reviewed is the famed chapter seven: “A More Exact 
Account of the Mode in Which the Bank of England Has Discharged Its Duty of 
Retaining a Good Bank Reserve, and of Administering It Effectually,” from Walter 
Bagehot’s book Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market.  Bagehot (1873) 
argues for a LLR’s existence and how it should function.  He begins the chapter 
explaining how the Bank of England (BoE) was not meant to hold excess stock or 
become an LLR3.  There is no legal justification for the BoE to have gained and 
continued this duty.   
He continues by describing the crisis of 1864 and how the BoE responded to the 
crisis.  Bagehot quotes the Governor of the Bank (Mr. Hankey) who praises BoE’s ability 
to easily lend funds to all who ask.  Bagehot praises the decision for the BoE to hold the 
excess reserves in the system.  He views it as critical that only one bank has this function 
and that it is clearly stated which bank holds this function.  Bagehot quotes Mr. Hankey’s 
response to The Economist where Mr. Hankey lays out the basic functions of a 
LLR.  Bagehot’s largest complaint on Hankey’s response was the assumption that BoE 
kept very large emergency funds at all times.  Bagehot (1873) explains, “'fresh money' 
                                            
3 The Bank of England was not meant to have extra funds (stock) that were not being lent 
out to other businesses or individuals to make a profit for the bank.  When other banks 
were short on necessary funds they could turn to BoE and receive some of its extra funds.  
Thus a lender of last resort was born. 
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could not be borrowed, even on the best security—even on Consols except at the Bank of 
England. There was no other lender to new borrowers.”  Bagehot is arguing that the LLR 
must be an institution that has the ability to create new credit and new money.  In a true 
panic, even the largest of reserves will not be enough. 
 Following his critique of Hankey’s response Bagehot advocates for a clear policy 
from the BoE to be announced so that the public knows what to expect.  He insults the 
board of the BoE claiming, “they are a board of plain, sensible, prosperous English 
merchants.”  He quotes two Bank directors and then immediately disagrees with what 
they are saying.  Bagehot lists some instances of panic, the total bank reserves at that time 
and how those reserves impacted the money market to show how critical a strong 
emergency reserve is to the success of the economy of England. 
 Bagehot spends a lot of the chapter convincing the reader that holding and lending 
an emergency reserve is the most critical job of the BoE.  He explains: 
The keepers of the Banking reserve, whether one or many, are obliged then to 
use that reserve for their own safety.  If they permit all other forms of credit to 
perish, their own will perish immediately, and in consequence. 
As to the Bank of England, however, this is denied.  It is alleged that the Bank of 
England can keep aloof in a panic; that it can, if it will, let other banks and trades 
fail; that if it chooses, it can stand alone, and survive intact while all else perishes 
around it. 
 
He argues that without spending the reserve there are no other forms of credit available to 
anyone and the entire economy will dry up.  The BoE allowing all other forms of credit to 
perish would nowadays mean the interbank lending market and commercial paper market 
are at a standstill.  Claiming that the BoE itself would perish is a bold statement, but if 
they have allowed all other forms of credit to be used without contributing, BoE will need 
an enormous amount of reserves released into the economy simultaneously to have a 
German ELA in Crisis  Gillenwater 17 
 
chance of restarting that economy.  Especially because “in a panic there is no new money 
to be had; everybody who has it clings to it, and will not part with it”.  Bagehot goes 
through an elaborate explanation for why keeping extensive reserves is crucial to the 
wellbeing of the economy.  This hinges on the idea that there is no new money.  A bank 
cannot count on repaid liabilities to fund the reserves because no one is repaying their 
liabilities, nor can they sell stock or equity because there is no one willing to part with 
their liquid money to purchase them. 
 Bagehot ends the chapter with some tidbits of wisdom and advice for all banks 
potentially facing a panic in their economies.  He opens with:  
And for the Bank of England, as with other Banks in the same case, these 
advances, if they are to be made at all, should be made so as if possible to obtain 
the object for which they are made.  The end is to stay the panic; and the advances 
should, if possible, stay the panic. 
 
Bagehot is now using the experience of Bank of England and the number of panics that it 
had survived to extrapolate recommendations for how all LLRs can also survive any 
future panics and sustain their economies.   
The two big takeaways are “that these loans should only be made at a very high 
rate of interest… these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as 
largely the public ask for them”.  The high rate of interest “operate as a heavy fine on 
unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons 
who do not require it”.  Meaning that only banks that really need the credit will apply for 
loans, and they will apply immediately because the longer they wait the higher the 
interest rate.  The advances are made freely to “stay alarm, and nothing therefore should 
be done to cause alarm.  But the way to cause alarm is to refuse someone who has good 
security to offer”.  The idea being as long as there are loans being given to these banks 
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then there cannot be any major problem with them.  The advances are given on good 
securities because “no advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately 
lose”. 
 Bagehot argues that his recommendations are relevant and important because he 
sees lending reserves as the best way to get out of a panic, “this is the method of making 
its money go the farthest, and of enabling it to get through the panic if anything will so 
enable it.”  He claims, “making no loans as we have seen will ruin it; making large loans 
and stopping, as we have also seen, will ruin it”.  Basically the idea he is presenting is 
best because the other examples he provided have resulted in failure.  The evidence he 
provides is analysis of The Bank of England in various panics in the mid-late nineteenth 
century, 1847, 1857 and 1866.  He is surprisingly positive in his critique of bank 
procedures with one major caveat: the BoE must be more upfront and honest about how 
much credit it is willing to loan and on what security it will be made.  He feels this will 
greatly decrease any panic because there will be confidence in the Bank and its actions. 
 Given the degree to which I will be discussing Bagehot’s recommendations in the 
rest of this paper, I will keep my comments here to a minimum.  The greatest potential 
for Bagehot to be considered no longer relevant to our economy comes from the changes 
in the world’s economy since Bagehot published his book.  Bagehot wrote about a single 
country, and panics that affected primarily that country.  While England was arguably the 
strongest country in the world at the time of publication, its economy was much closer to 
being protected from attacks from the outside than any major country is now.  The world 
did not have a “world economy” or a technology driven economy in the same sense that 
we do now.  While there were international companies and banks, the world of 
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international finance has only gotten more complex and intertwined as time passed.  The 
arguments that Bagehot makes and the recommendations he gives are very logical and 
well backed in the evidence he provides, but the world he is describing is dated and no 
longer in existence.   This is the question I will spend the rest of the paper discussing, do 
his ideas still hold true in our modern, complicated and globalized financial system? 
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III. Literature Analysis 
 
In traditional economic theory Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market by 
Walter Bagehot is the original word on the concept of Lenders of Last Resort 
(LLRs).  Bagehot’s writings in the nineteenth century still shape how modern economists 
evaluate LLRs.  According to Bagehot (1873), in a financial panic “the holders of the 
ultimate Bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to all that bring good 
securities quickly, freely, and readily.”  The “holders of ultimate bank reserves” are the 
bank(s) most easily equipped to provide large sums of currency without constraints.  This 
typically falls on the central banking system (the banks able to directly enact monetary 
policy) because of its ability to print and create currency, but any bank with a large 
reserve of cash could fulfill this role.  Critically Bagehot (1873) believes the holder of 
reserves “should lend to all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily”.  In 
other words, the LLRs should have funds easily available for any institution that can 
provide acceptable collateral. He complicates this standard by adding two rules:  
First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This 
will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest 
number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised 
early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out 
of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be 
protected as far as possible. 
 
Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking 
securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. 
  
These two rules function to penalize banks from unnecessarily seeking liquidity while 
providing a sense of security to the market as a whole because the LLR is carrying on as 
usual. 
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 The problems of these rules are twofold; first, the high rate of interest Bagehot is 
advocating for will only worsen the liquidity problems for a bank.  It is seeking excess 
funds because it cannot make current payments on the liabilities it already holds, 
charging a high rate of interest will discourage many banks from seeking excess liquidity 
because they cannot afford the interest and will further penalize and jeopardize banks that 
are facing a serious liquidity crisis.  Bagehot avoids this dilemma by assuming a 
separating equilibrium for the banks pursuing liquidity assistance.  There are two 
categories of banks, solvent but illiquid and insolvent.  The LLR must choose which bank 
to provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to but the LLR does not want to give 
ELA to an insolvent bank.  The “penalty rate” interest rate ideally discourages insolvent 
banks from applying for ELA because the high interest rate will be impossible for 
insolvent banks to repay.  Theoretically this reveals which banks are only illiquid because 
they will be the only banks applying for ELA from the LLRs. The insolvent banks will 
just fail. 
 The problem with assuming a separating equilibrium is that you assume banks, 
and bankers, would not try to game the system and that situations are static.  As the 
Financial Crisis bled into the Sovereign Debt Crisis and just kept getting worse, it seemed 
that every financial institution was having difficulties meeting its solvency 
requirements.  That is not to say that every institution was insolvent or even close to it, 
but there definitely were banks, and countries, disguising the magnitude of their financial 
woes.  Many banks, and bankers, are incentivized to end the quarter on a high.  They are 
motivated to hide how dire the situation really is until the latest round of bonuses have 
been approved or the first LLR agrees to provide ELA.  Due to the chaos of the global 
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financial sector, LLRs were looking to each other as signaling devices for solvent and 
trustworthy banks.  Once ELA was available from one source, ELA from many other 
sources would then become available. 
As Domanski et al (2014) explained, approval of European Central Bank (ECB) 
emergency funds requires approval of the EU Board of Governors.  This approval process 
inherently ties the analysis of bank solvency to approval of the government in 
charge.  Given the strict requirements for government deficits and liquidity of financial 
institutions, EU countries had a strong incentive to lie about the true nature of their 
financial troubles.  Violation of the Maastricht Treaty4 could lead to not only a loss of 
ELA access but potentially to exit from the Eurozone as a whole.  Governors from each 
country also had an incentive to please the other Governors if they knew their country 
would be asking for funds eventually. 
Trying to keep in a country’s good graces and keep up appearances violates 
Bagehot’s assumption of a separating equilibrium.  The moment a country is more 
concerned with being seen as solvent the incentive to remain truthful shifts.  The 
politicized nature of ELA approval means that appearances are crucial for the survival of 
an EU country’s economy.  While this could work in favor of the separating equilibrium, 
countries may be more willing to let some banks fail because they do not want to be seen 
as asking too much from the ECB.  The ECB also has an incentive to keep all of its major 
banks afloat.  Insolvency and failure of a major EU bank would drastically reduce the 
confidence in the European banking and finance system. 
                                            
4 The Maastricht Treaty officially established the European Union in 1993.  Included in 
the Treaty were a number of fiscal requirements including limiting debt to 60% of GDP 
and no annual deficits greater than 3% of GDP. 
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This means the ECB has a large incentive to only approve funding for banks that 
are simply illiquid, but once ECB has approved funding for a bank they are very 
motivated to keep providing liquidity and credit until the entire panic is over and the bank 
is solvent again.  No one, especially not a large and important central bank, wants to be 
seen making a mistake when providing funding and rescuing banks.  The interconnected 
nature of the global economy now means that changes in one area of the world affect all 
economies.  When Bagehot was writing the English economy was much more protected 
from shocks in the rest of the world. 
Secondly, there is a lot of confusion and debate on what qualifies as “good 
banking securities”.  At the peak of the bubble many more things may count as a good 
security than during the panic and liquidity crisis following the burst of the bubble.  In 
fact, a bank facing a liquidity crisis may have many securities in its book that can no 
longer be defined as a good security and keep a bank that needs liquidity assistance from 
receiving it.  Bagehot (1873) clarifies his definition of a good security as one that “in 
ordinary times is reckoned a good security” but this does not solve the problem.  Banks 
that are severely affected by a liquidity crisis are also probably the banks holding the 
highest number of securities that no one views in “ordinary times” as good. 
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis and its ongoing recovery, the provision of 
ELA funds has been scrutinized.  The Eurozone provided a lot of liquidity to its member 
countries through each country’s central bank.  As Domanski et al (2014) explains the 
funds were dispensed through a variety of methods including; central bank swap lines, 
extending credit to prevent failure of systematically important institutions, stepping into 
“malfunctioning interbank markets” and, providing funding to increase liquidity in 
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specific markets. They (2014) continue, the ECB provided ELA to “a much broader 
range of counterparties and against a broad range of collateral”.  The Eurozone 
participated in exceptional long-term open market operations to solve shortage of term 
funding problems, and central bank swap lines to solve a shortage of reserves in foreign 
currencies.  In late 2008 the ECB basically established a fully elastic supply of central 
bank reserves by moving to refinancing more banks with looser collateral standards at 
fixed rates. 
 The ECB dramatically increased what assets it was willing to accept as collateral 
and Germany followed suit by creating new liquidity providing programs.  In 2008 it 
began accepting temporarily illiquid assets, especially asset backed securities (ABS), 
instead of liquid collateral.  Domanski et al. (2014) demonstrates that this change in 
policy allowed the percentage of ABS pledged to rise from 6% to 28%.  Having seen 
liquidity dry up in the covered bond market, ECB instituted the covered bond purchase 
program (CBPP).  The CBPP allowed the ECB to buy up eligible covered bonds5 up to 
€60 billion to provide needed liquidity into a crucial market for bank funding.  Rixtel and 
Gasperini (2013) show that in December 2011 Germany re-activated a government-
guaranteed bond issuance program6.  All of these demonstrated an increase in LLR 
functions.  The ECB and the German central bank realized the crisis was more far-
reaching than the panics Bagehot analyzed and responded by taking more unorthodox 
actions to provide liquidity to their banks. 
                                            
5 A covered bond is a bond backed by either mortgages or public sector loans 
6 The government guaranteed payment of interest and principal of private bonds in case 
the original bond issuer became insolvent or defaulted 
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The Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) provided by ECB and 
explained in Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) were conducted in December 2011 and 
February 2012 totaled around €1 trillion and provided alternatives to both short and long-
term wholesale funding markets.  Germany received €74 billion in LTRO funding from 
ECB.  While the LTRO is not considered traditional ELA, it does function in a similar 
matter.  It provides an influx of credit for a longer than average period, three years rather 
than several months, at a low interest rate with significantly reduced collateral 
requirements.  LTRO funds are available in unlimited quantities (full allotment) by 
pledging a growing list of collateral to either the ECB or the home country’s central 
bank.  The interest rate available on the LTRO loans is based on the average of the 
overnight rate during the loan period but fell to as low as 1% during February 2012. 
 Following Bagehot’s rules for LLRs, I believe he would disapprove of ECB’s 
LTRO program.  The ECB and subsequently Germany’s Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FMSA), central bank for financial market stabilization, did an 
unquestionably good job of providing easily available credit to all those who asked. They 
followed Bagehot’s (1873) advice that “every gentleman who came here with adequate 
security was liberally dealt with” and “The Bank of England agrees to give other banks 
the requisite assistance in case of need, and the other banks agree to ask for it” but the 
ECB struggled with making funds readily available.  The “full allotment” commitment of 
LTRO successfully satisfies the idea of easily available credit to all those who 
ask.   Using Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung, Special Financial Market 
Stabilization Funds (SoFFin), the institution set up to provide liquidity assistance for 
German banks; assistance is available provided an institution satisfies ten well advertised 
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criteria.  Many banks did and SoFFin provided up to €530.8 billion in liquidity assistance 
from its creation in 2011 to mid-2015 (SoFFin 2015).  Bagehot (1873) recommends, “in a 
panic the holders of the ultimate Bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to 
all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily”.  The freely and readily seem to 
be satisfied.  Funds were also made available quickly, banks seeking SoFFin funds were 
approved using a computerized process to match firms with the announced criteria. 
ECB funding however was much more of a process.  As Götz et al (2015) 
explain, ECB funding is “intertwined with the decision at the higher level.  Political 
and/or fiscal decision leading to a financial rescue of a sovereign indirectly also lead to 
the maintained solvency of its banks”.  Because ECB funding requires approval from 
ECB’s Council of Governors, the process is immediately elongated and instantly 
politicized.  Instead of being a pure evaluation of solvency and liquidity requirements, 
ELA approval is now tied to approval of the country’s government and policies.  This 
extra step blatantly violates Bagehot’s recommendation for quickly available funds. 
 While in practice all LTRO funds were covered by collateral, the widespread 
nature of the 2008 Financial Crisis and subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis made 
determining illiquidity versus insolvency extremely difficult.  Banks may have originally 
been only illiquid but as the crisis continued to unfold they became insolvent.  ECB and 
FMSA drastically increased their list of acceptable collateral past what Bagehot (1873) 
describes as “in ordinary times is reckoned a good security”.  Quickly ABS were a 
significant portion of collateral put up to receive ECB funds and FMSA provided “Wind-
down Agencies” for banks to unload “non-performing” assets and unload risk in 
exchange for available liquidity.  Bagehot’s recommendations for LLRs are meant to 
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avoid potential losses from provided ELA and both ECB and FMSA have opened 
themselves up to potential losses. 
 FMSA provided a significant amount of credit to Commerzbank, originally €8.2 
billion from SoFFin followed by another €15 billion in guarantees and eventually another 
€10 billion in capital and a 25% plus one takeover by SoFFin (Brown 2009).  In total 
Germany provided €33.2 billion in credit and liquidity assistance to Commerzbank but it 
was still not enough to avoid a takeover and buyout by the public.  According to 
Bagehot’s two rules: liquidity assistance should be made at a high interest rate and that it 
should be supported by good collateral, Commerzbank succeeds in theory but 
unfortunately due to its place in the world economy, it is trapped by the high interest rate 
and the deterioration of its collateral. 
 While the original €8.2 billion in SoFFin liquidity was first provided at an 8.5% 
interest rate and then lowered to a 5.5% interest rate, Commerzbank required more 
liquidity assistance as time wore on and seemed to go from illiquid to insolvent.  As time 
passed and more losses on Commerzbank’s books became apparent the net worth of 
Commerzbank tanked, the total value of the stock market capitalization of the bank fell to 
€4 billion (nearly a quarter of the total government assistance).  Expecting Commerzbank 
to repay the total debt plus 8.5% interest while the bank’s value is falling and it is not 
making a profit seems illogical.  Commerzbank suffered a loss of €716 million in the 
fourth quarter of 2012 and went multiple years without paying dividends to its 
stockholders.  Commerzbank worked hard to raise capital, mostly through issuing new 
stock to existing shareholders in an effort to quickly pay back the German central bank 
and show strength.  However, still being unable to pay shareholders easily demonstrates 
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that Commerzbank is still working towards full recovery years after receiving liquidity 
assistance. 
 SoFFin attempted to lower the interest rate it charged Commerzbank as the crisis 
went on, the original €8.2 was divided into two €4.1 billion trances the first with an 8.5% 
interest rate and the second with a 5.5% interest rate.  Those rates are enormously high as 
banks worldwide faced liquidity problems.  SoFFin succeeded in penalizing 
Commerzbank for needing liquidity assistance and very probably dissuaded banks from 
requesting ELA but the high interest rates forced Commerzbank to focus on repaying the 
loans as quickly as possible rather than rebuilding its business to be profitable 
again.  Commerzbank was also forced to return to SoFFin multiple times for more ELA 
of differing types begging the counterfactual of what would have happened if the interest 
rate provided for the ELA had been more manageable. 
 It is probably safe to assume that the collateral provided by Commerzbank would 
not have been accepted during ordinary times, as Bagehot recommends.  ECB and FMSA 
increased their list of acceptable collateral because they realized that needy banks would 
be unable to provide the typical collateral.  When bank needs as much ELA as 
Commerzbank did, they have a number of underperforming assets on their books.  These 
underperforming assets would not be usable as collateral in an ordinary time.  As this 
Crisis continued to unfold and Europe faced its own Crisis simultaneously more assets 
became unacceptable in ordinary times.  SoFFin also considered banks on more facets 
than the available collateral; business strategy, use of funds received, remuneration of 
management, employees, etc., capital adequacy, dividend payments, time period, 
measures to foster competition, fund accountability and other provisions decided by the 
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supervising body.  This holistic approach is presumably to give a chance for banks that 
are facing a collateral crunch on top of the liquidity crunch. 
Commerzbank required more than one round of ELA from SoFFin and FMSA 
and the eventual takeover meant that Commerzbank became insolvent yet Germany 
continued to provide them with liquidity assistance.  This is a clear violation of Bagehot’s 
biggest point, never lend at a loss.  As a bank requires more and more rounds of ELA it 
demonstrates that the situation is worse than originally anticipated or presented.  A bank 
that only requires one round of ELA is probably only suffering from a small liquidity 
crisis or has realized that they are now insolvent and are following Bagehot’s assumed 
separating equilibrium and taking themselves out of the game.  A bank that needs more 
than one round has a growing need for liquidity, meaning they either lied in the first 
round because they were weary of being approved for the full amount needed, or their 
situation grew more dire as time went on leading them closer and closer to 
insolvency.  Commerzbank required three separate capital influxes and was still so 
insolvent it needed a government takeover.  As Commerzbank became progressively 
more illiquid and insolvent they should have taken themselves out of the running for 
more ELA. 
SoFFin should have also realized that Commerzbank was sinking and not exposed 
themselves to that risk.  It seems that they both suffered from an “in for a penny, in for a 
pound mentality”: the more liquidity assistance provided to Commerzbank the more 
SoFFin is tied to Commerzbank’s success.  Once the original credit was dispersed, 
SoFFin looks bad if they provided assistance to a bank that subsequently failed. For 
appearances sake, SoFFin is motivated to ensure that every bank they approve for 
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liquidity assistance originally becomes and remains solvent to avoid further panic in the 
economy.  While this should mean that SoFFin screens every institution applying for 
ELA very carefully and selectively approves funds, the dilemma of systemically 
important banks becomes relevant again.   
According to Bagehot, SoFFin and FMSA should only provide funding to banks 
that can demonstrate they are solvent but illiquid without regard to how that will affect 
SoFFin and FMSA’s image.  Bagehot’s standards mean that by providing lots of liquidity 
to anyone who asks and is able to provide proper collateral, FMSA and SoFFin would be 
able to avoid further panic.  But Bagehot’s plan to avoid a panic did not include 
systemically important banks.  As it stands now, SoFFin and FMSA could do exactly as 
Bagehot asks but a greater panic could follow the failure of Commerzbank than a panic 
where Commerzbank is funneled undeserved liquidity assistance.  Central banks in other 
countries have followed his advice, but when Lehman Brothers failed the consequences 
of that decision were felt worldwide.  ELA is supposed to boost the confidence in an 
institution, it is supposed to show the public that the government has faith in the bank so 
everyone else should also.  But if a bank is now considered “too big to fail”, receiving 
ELA can have the opposite effect.  That action now signals to the public that something is 
amiss within that institution.  Instead of showing confidence in the security and solvency 
of a bank, giving ELA to a bank now shows concern for the wellbeing of the bank and 
may be followed by a takeover or run on the bank. 
The third case is that of Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) and the state of 
Bavaria.  BayernLB received €15.3 billion in guarantees from SoFFin from year end 
2008 to year-end 2011 (SoFFin 2015).  In addition to these funds, BayernLB also 
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received €10 billion in capital and a €4.8 billion risk shield from the Bavarian 
government (Bloomberg 2012).  All of the ELA received by BayernLB and other similar 
Landesbanks has led to a discussion on the relevance of Landesbanks 
currently.  BayernLB received over €30 billion in assistance from national and regional 
authorities and it was subject to a public bailout to ensure its survival in the 
future.  BayernLB failed to provide good banking securities, but the lawmakers and 
taxpayers of Bavaria succeeding in providing easily accessible liquidity when 
asked.  SoFFin also failed to avoid lending at a loss in this situation, the €15.3 billion in 
guarantees were given at market price rather than the actual value of asset at present time. 
The interest SoFFin took for their guarantees fell between .5% and 2% (FMSA 
2010). This seems like a much more reasonable interest rate to charge banks that are 
facing a liquidity crisis than the rate charged to Commerzbank, but BayernLB asked for a 
different type of assistance from SoFFin.  While Commerzbank needed recapitalization, 
BayernLB only needed a guarantee for debt securities.  A major part of this assistance 
meant that SoFFin accepted various securities from BayernLB and provided BayernLB 
with an amount of liquid capital equivalent to the amount of non-liquid securities they 
traded in.  This functions less like a loan and more like a payment-in-kind.  This allows 
SoFFin to charge a much lower interest rate rather than a traditional recapitalization 
loan.  However, an additional 2% on €15.3 billion (€306 million) is a sizeable required 
interest payment and would theoretically act like a penalty rate as Bagehot advises. 
The guarantees provided to BayernLB were done on the promise of “an adequate 
capital base” which BayernLB was able to produce.  Many institutions had billions of 
dollars of securities they were willing to put up for guarantees.  Receiving a guarantee on 
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an asset that is underperforming functions like free money.  BayernLB had a large stake 
in the mortgage-backed securities market and as the floor continued to fall out of that 
market, having SoFFin provide a guarantee at face value rather than market value was an 
enormous capital injection.  Truthfully, BayernLB did provide a lot of capital to receive a 
guarantee upon, but SoFFin’s decision to provide a guarantee on the face value of the 
securities rather than the market value of the asset eliminates the idea of an “adequate 
capital base”.  If BayernLB can provide a portfolio full of assets with face values over 
€15 billion and receive that large of a guarantee even if the market value is significantly 
lower than that, what is the point of requiring collateral at all? 
 More alarmingly, guaranteeing face value of a security opens SoFFin up to major 
losses.  Underperforming assets of this magnitude are not going to suddenly turn around 
and become well performing assets.  Even if the guarantee is being provided at a 
moderate rate of interest for three to five years, mortgage-backed securities will never be 
worth the face value they had just before the bubble burst.  At best SoFFin can hope to 
break even on the guarantees because of the interest, realistically they lent with the 
anticipation of a loss.  This is a clear violation of Bagehot’s recommendations. 
Given BayernLB’s ability to receive funds from the taxpayers of Bavaria also 
reduces the need to apply for SoFFin funding and meet their standards.  Previous to the 
Financial Crisis BayernLB was still majority owned by the state of Bavaria, this unique 
Landesbank relationship means that the Bavarian government has a controlling stake in 
BayernLB.  The controlling stake requires that the government of Bavaria be held 
ultimately responsible for the actions of BayernLB.  The assumption of the separating 
equilibrium was again violated in this case.  BayernLB is such a large part of this 
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economy that the incentives for BayernLB to remain solvent are very large and present 
for the bank and the state.  Bavaria is such a large and wealthy state that the failing of its 
Landesbank would signal that the entire economy of that state is failing.  By propping up 
its Landesbank Bavaria shows Germany, and the world as a whole, that Landesbanks and 
BayernLB in particular are still relevant, important and functional.  All executives in 
BayernLB want that to be demonstrated to the public, they want to keep their jobs.  The 
state of Bavaria is invested in keeping regional control of their bank, and too large a 
bailout from SoFFin would not allow that to happen.  By providing a large amount of 
credit on whatever collateral was available lets the state of Bavaria keep such large 
control over their Landesbank and signals to the rest of the world that Bavaria and 
Germany are doing fine.  Having to divulge that the bank you as a state regulate and 
manage is insolvent eliminates all faith that the people of Bavaria have in their 
lawmakers and could easily mean the lawmakers are out of a job.  Both groups meant to 
regulate the dealings of BayernLB are invested in keeping up appearances as long as 
possible. 
While the lawmakers of Bavaria did ensure that funds were easily available to 
BayernLB, they did not seem to assess whether the funds should be provided.  Given the 
size of BayernLB and its importance to the economy of Bavaria, providing liquidity 
assistance seemed like an effective way to prevent a panic.  By providing assistance from 
the state rather than the nation lawmakers ensured they would retain control of the 
Landesbank and it displays an image of control.  BayernLB was critically important to 
the lawmakers of Bavaria and they were unwilling to let it be taken away from them 
either through a national takeover or a failure of the bank. 
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If BayernLB did require a large amount of financial assistance from the central 
government it would demonstrate that the financial situation in the bank was more dire 
than anticipated and would reflect poorly on the lawmakers and the state of Bavaria as a 
whole.  The more dismal the situation appears to the outside world, the more likely 
BayernLB is to receive help from SoFFin or FMSA and the more likely the lawmakers of 
Bavaria are to lose their jobs (just look at Greece’s rolling government roster).  A 
separating equilibrium cannot hold in this situation, parties have too much to lose by 
being truthful and facing the consequences. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
 
The conclusions regarding stigma and a separating equilibrium raised earlier encouraged 
further investigation.  In the financial world, a firm’s stock price represents the public’s 
trust in the company.  Using simple laws of supply and demand, as public trust in the 
company or firm increases demand for the stock of that company rises and the stock price 
rises accordingly.  The same works in reverse: lack of trust leads to a decrease in demand 
and a fall in the stock price.  The analysis presented earlier in the paper led to the 
conclusion that the systemically important banks receipt of ELA would erode public 
confidence and therefore lower the rate of return on holding stock more than can be 
explained by typical market variance.   
As explained earlier, “ELA is supposed to boost the confidence in an institution, 
it’s supposed to show the public that the government has faith in the bank so everyone 
else should also...That action [receiving ELA] now signals to the public that something is 
amiss within that institution”.  As this paper focuses on two institutions--Commerzbank 
and BayernLB--it would be ideal to test this assumption for both banks but unfortunately 
BayernLB’s status as a Landesbank means there is no publically available stock 
price.  Commerzbank however, is a publically traded company and the data is available 
for it.  To restate, the conclusion or hypothesis being tested empirically is: 
Commerzbank’s status as a systemically important bank means the massive amounts of 
ELA received by Commerzbank should have provided an excess of public distrust in 
Commerzbank. 
The excess public distrust would have shown up as an otherwise unexplained 
change in the rate of return for the bank’s closing stock price.  I will therefore conduct an 
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event study.  The Fama/French 3 factor model is used to capture more explained variance 
than the traditional CAPM model.  The factor considered for above market returns with 
CAPM is the riskiness of a stock or asset.  The augmented Fama/French model used here 
incorporates three additional factors: Small Minus Large (SMB), High Minus Low 
(HML) and, Winner Minus Loser (WML) (Brückner et al., 2014).  Small Minus Big 
represents the difference in rates of return for firms with small market capitalization and 
the rates of return for firms with large market capitalization.  The breakpoints for “small” 
and “big” firms were the median of the entire portfolio.  High Minus Low represents the 
difference in rates of return for high value stocks and rates of return for low value, or 
growth, stocks.  Winner Minus Loser represents a momentum factor; winners tend to 
keep winning, rising stocks continue to rise, and losers tend to keep losing, falling stocks 
continue to fall.  WML is the difference between the rate of returns for winning stocks 
and the rate of returns for losing stocks.  In order to capture variance in the total German 
market the rate of return for closing prices in Volkswagen stock was included.  Including 
all of those variables my equation looks like the following: 
RC-Rf= α +β1 [Rm-Rf]+β2 SMB+β3 HML+β4 WML+β5 RV+Ɛ 
In this model Rc-Rf represents the rate of return for Commerzbank minus the risk-free 
rate of return, this difference represents the profitable return to holding Commerzbank 
stock.  α is the constant.  Rm-Rf is the market rate of return minus the risk-free rate of 
return; this difference represents the profitability of holding the market portfolio.  Rv is 
the rate of return for Volkswagen and Ɛ is the error term. 
The focus is on the public’s response to the announcement of Commerzbank’s 
receipt of ELA funds.  This happened on three separate dates: November 3rd, 2008; 
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January 8th, 2009 and; December 14th, 2011.  The closeness of the first two dates reflects 
the chaos happening in the international banking and finance sectors during the beginning 
of the crisis while the distance from the third date gave the German public and the 
international community a lot of time to process what had happened and what 
Commerzbank’s role in the crisis was. 
 The important nature of bailout announcements necessitates confidentiality until 
the official public statement is made, but given the potential for gain if one knew the 
information ahead of time it is likely that information was leaked.  This information 
would be leaked to those most likely to take advantage of it, such as other higher ups in 
the financial or banking sector.  That should be reflected by an unexplained decrease in 
the stock prices because demand for Commerzbank would fall.  To accommodate this the 
regression was run four weeks ahead of the announcement, one week ahead of the 
announcement and on the day the announcement was officially made.  Incorporating all 
of this information, the unexplained change should be highest one week out from the 
announcement (the decision for a bailout has been made and information has likely been 
disseminated to other people in power) for each bailout and overall for the third bailout 
(the time between the first two bailouts and the third bailout allowed time for public 
distrust to brew). 
 The coefficient of most importance is β4.  This is the beta in front of the 
momentum factor WML.  If receiving ELA is being met with a stigma and public distrust 
that would make Commerzbank a losing firm.  As losing firms continue to lose, the β in 
front of momentum should be negative, and large.  The momentum of losing will 
perpetuate more losing and decrease profitable returns to Commerzbank. 
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 The data set being used included the following variables: the daily market rate of 
return provided by Brückner et al., the daily yield on the short term German bond, the 
rate of returns for the daily closing stock prices for Commerzbank and Volkswagen, 
adjusted for dividends, and the augmented German Fama/French factors (SMB, HML, 
and WML).  The dates of the data set are from January 3rd, 2000 until December 30th, 
2011.  The daily returns are consistent and without holes, except for the major bank 
holiday from July 28th to August 18th, 2008.  For consistency, all variables’ differences 
were summed during that period. 
 Unfortunately for all of the regressions there is a lack of significant results.  The 
highest r-squared term is 0.0032 for one week out from the first announcement, October 
27th, 2008 (Table 1).  As shown on the included table of results, the only significant 
coefficient is for the rate of return for the Volkswagen stock and it is only significant at 
the 10% level.  Having such a low r-squared term in fact speaks to the lack of relationship 
between any of the variables, except between Commerzbank and Volkswagen.  This 
relationship makes sense because both companies are predominantly affected by 
developments on the German stock market.  Unsurprisingly the coefficient on the 
Volkswagen rate of return is positive, as both Commerzbank and Volkswagen are large 
multinational German firms so as one does well the other will benefit.  If Volkswagen has 
record sales, that increases confidence in the entire German market and that is reflected in 
an increase in confidence for Commerzbank.  Additionally, neither the augmented 
Fama/French variables nor the excess risk of the market bear any relationship to 
Commerzbank.   
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Table 1. Excess returns to Commerzbank daily stock holdings 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Profitable returns to the Market Portfolio (Rm-Rf) - 0.0506  
(0.1072) 
Size (SMB) 0.1027  
(0.1150) 
Volume (HML) 0.0622 
(0.0789) 
Momentum (WML) 0.0068  
(0.0581) 
Volkswagen Rate of Return (Rv) 0.0649*  
(0.0369) 
Constant (α) 0.0851  
(0.0579) 
Notes: 
N= 2281 
R2= 0.0032 
*Statistical significance at 10% 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 As the data being used is a time-series, the Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey 
tests were run to detect possible autocorrelation.  While the Durbin-Watson test did not 
indicate autocorrelation, the Breusch-Godfrey test did so the regression was corrected 
with Newey-West standard errors.   The results of that regression are below (Table 2) but 
they further demonstrate the lack of significance problem; there are no longer any 
significant variables. 
Table 2. Excess returns to Commerzbank daily stock holdings corrected for 
autocorrelation 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Profitable returns to the Market Portfolio (Rm-Rf) -0.0506 
(0.1021) 
Size (SMB) 0.1027 
(0.1064) 
Volume (HML) 0.0622 
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(0.0650) 
Momentum (WML) 0.0067 
(0.0512) 
Volkswagen Rate of Return (Rv) 0.0649 
(0.0423) 
Constant (α) 0.0851 
(0.0591) 
Notes: 
N= 2281 
F-stat= 1.62 
df= 5, 2275 
p-value= 0.1516 
Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses 
 
These results do not support the hypothesis stated above.  One cannot draw 
conclusions about anything in this regression because of the insignificance of all 
variables included.  Instead of being able to easily infer the presence of a quantifiable 
potential stigma of receiving ELA funds in this instance, no substantial conclusions can 
be drawn.  While the number of observations included in this regression is high, the 
regression is only focused on one particular institution. 
 The literary analysis given earlier focuses on three case studies meant to 
exemplify how Bagehot’s rules have failed in the new environment of systemically 
important banks.  While ideally this regression would have demonstrated an unexpected 
stigma, the lack of any results does not definitively disprove the existence of a 
stigma.  There is still a high possibility that the stigma is included in the large 
unexplained portion however, the lack of significance makes drawing any conclusions 
about the size and force of the stigma impossible.  Rather the non-relationship 
demonstrated in this instance does not conclusively signal anything. 
It should be made clear that this does not mean that there was no change in stock 
prices as when the bailouts were announced, stock prices changed  -12.38%, +12.42% 
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and -6.25% on each bailout announcement date; rather the variables chosen in this 
particular regression hold no clues for explanation.  A number of other opinions and 
variables could, and probably do, hold the keys for understanding. For example; 
perceptions of bank stock may have been very skewed during this time, regulatory 
changes may have been more important, the amount of the bailouts could have been very 
important, et cetera.   
As the Financial Crisis deepened it became clear that banks and financial 
institutions were receiving a special treatment not seen before.  The panic and confusion 
that grew out of the failure of Lehman Brothers paralyzed so many regulators and 
politicians from allowing many other institutions to fail.  While regular business were 
still allowed to fail and not guaranteed receipt of any emergency funds, banks were not 
turned away and LLRs kept finding new ways to provide banks with funding.  As banks, 
and particularly systemically important banks, were receiving special treatment, it 
logically follows that bank stock should receive special perceptions. 
The EU’s unique financial situation kept numerous countries informed of the 
regulations being imposed on other banks.  Access to ELA funds required unanimous 
approval of the Board of Governors so countries seeking ELA for their banks would have 
disclosed how they were changing or regulating their banks.  The EU environment 
provided an arena for direct comparison between countries.  As such, the regulatory 
changes for Germany (as the financial powerhouse of the EU) would have been very 
important for investors in German banks.  If the banking and regulatory environment was 
drastically changing the international community would have been very interested. 
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The definition of Commerzbank as a systemically important bank has never been 
disputed, it remains Germany’s second largest private bank.  After the fall of Lehman 
Brothers people began to use the phrases “systemically important” or “too big to 
fail”.  Securing a bailout for a large bank was no longer in contention.  What was still up 
for discussion became the amount and makeup of the bailout: would it be a straight loan? 
Would it be through the government buying shares? Would it be a guarantee?  Or of 
another form yet unseen?  That uncertainty, as does any uncertainty, strains the markets 
and the price of stocks.  These are just three examples of other variables not included that 
may explain the change in the price of Commerzbank stock, but because they were not a 
part of the regression stated above, again there are no conclusions that can be drawn. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
While Germany and its financial institutions may never face the public scrutiny that other 
countries, banks and emergency funds have faced, we now know Germany required ELA 
and dispersed it ineffectively.  Walter Bagehot’s recommendations provide a consistent 
baseline for judgment no matter the scale of the crisis.  He does not take scope or amount 
given into consideration, making his advice easily applicable to modern problems.  His 
three pieces of advice: lend freely to all who ask and can provide adequate collateral, at a 
high penalty rate and, avoid lending at a loss, should still apply today.  Bagehot’s 
separating equilibrium is critical to his recommendations but seems to no longer apply in 
today’s situations.  A separating equilibrium assumes that a situation is static and that all 
players will not try to beat the game.  While bankers in nineteenth century England may 
have acted in the same manner, European countries and banks definitely violated those 
assumptions.   
All institutions that find themselves in the LLR position are invested in the 
continued strength and solvency of the financial sector and should be doing everything 
they can to protect it.  Following the 2008 Financial Crisis and the subsequent Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, the ECB found itself in that position.  Following Bagehot’s 
recommendations would mean that the ECB lent easily and freely to all those who asked 
at a high interest rate provided they gave substantial collateral.  As the crises deepened, 
the types of collateral that were accepted grew and the types of liquidity assistance 
evolved and expanded.  The penalty rate was not consistently charged, the interest rates 
on LTROs fell to one percent at one point.  The ECB accepted the collateral at above 
market prices for many securities, especially ABS, and effectively lent at a loss. 
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Within Germany, the central bank did not do a stellar job following Bagehot’s 
advice.  FMSA and SoFFin provided substantial liquidity assistance to Commerzbank.  In 
total €33.2 billion was provided, but Commerzbank still required a government 
takeover.  Commerzbank provided evidence of being insolvent rather than illiquid but 
SoFFin either ignored the evidence or did not recognize the evidence and eventually 
confirmed its insolvent status by taking it over.  The insolvency guarantees that SoFFin 
lent at a loss, Bagehot’s biggest concern.  It also demonstrates that the interest rate 
charged by SoFFin was not in fact a penalty rate, Commerzbank should have failed from 
the beginning (if the situation was static) or when they became insolvent (if the situation 
changed over time) because they were insolvent rather than string ECB and the German 
taxpayers along. 
BayernLB and the state of Bavaria fared fairly similarly.  SoFFin and FMSA 
failed to provide a penalty rate that successfully ensured a separating equilibrium would 
hold.  While BayernLB did provide some form of collateral, SoFFin provided their 
guarantees at face value and the lawmakers of Bavaria were eager to provide funds to 
ensure that BayernLB remained in Bavarian control.  Both of these actions opened up the 
German and Bavarian governments to losses, in strict violation of Bagehot’s 
recommendations. 
Empirically, however, Commerzbank fared a little bit better.  The hypothesis of 
Commerzbank having lots of public distrust cannot be confirmed.  The overall lack of a 
relationship between the augmented Fama/French factors and Commerzbank encourages 
further investigation.  I conclude my data analysis with a few variables that may explain 
the non-relationship, a regression including those variables is the logical next step.  If the 
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regression including the additional proposed variables has more significant results, the 
size of the public stigma and distrust can be more accurately predicted.  As nothing has 
been definitively proven, or disproven, there is still plenty of empirical work that could 
follow the investigation and analysis of systemically important banks.  
The limitations of my research came primarily from lack of data 
availability.  Receiving ELA comes with a stigma and a connotation of financial 
insecurity.  The continuous violations of Bagehot’s separating equilibrium eliminate the 
possibility of a bank being seen as solvent when receiving ELA.  When Bagehot wrote in 
1873, ELA could be seen as a signal of solvency because a bank that was willing to 
undertake a loan at the penalty rate had the funds to be able to repay the loan at a later 
date.  Now however, the incentives to follow a separating equilibrium and remain truthful 
when asking for ELA have changed so drastically that receiving ELA is now a signal for 
insolvency.   
Banks, both public and private, are unlikely to make that information easily 
available until the stigma is eliminated and trust in institutions applying for ELA 
recovers.  As it stands now, the culture around ELA seems unlikely to change.  Greece’s 
continued request for more liquidity assistance is still shrouded in some secrecy despite 
all the international news coverage.  Unfortunately, in order to update the 
recommendations for LLRs in current times it is imperative that this information becomes 
more easily available.  Creating generalizations and recommendations for what the LLR 
functions should be and how ELA should be dispersed becomes more accurate and 
realistic when there is more available data to test. 
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This research lends itself to the further development of LLRs and the theory 
behind their actions.  While Bagehot’s recommendations continue to be an important 
starting point for analyzing whether LLRs are effectively completing their tasks, the 2008 
global Financial Crisis and Europe’s subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis have alerted us of 
how dependent and connected the world economy is.  If systemically important financial 
institutions continue to be “too big to fail”, the expectations for LLRs must be 
updated.  Besides the problem of moral hazard from nearly guaranteed ELA availability, 
the penalty rate becomes pointless.  Systemically important institutions will receive ELA 
whether they are illiquid or insolvent and the assuming separating equilibrium will never 
hold.  Additionally, ensuring ELA is available to “too big to fail” banks requires 
accepting collateral that is often substandard because that is what is available and opens 
the LLR to potentially lending at a loss. 
  
German ELA in Crisis  Gillenwater 47 
 
VI. References 
 
Aitken, J., & Singh, M. (2009). Deleveraging after Lehman- evidence from reduced 
rehypothecation. IMF Working Paper. Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0942.pdf 
Bagehot, W. (1873). LOMBARD STREET: A Description of the Money Market. Kindle 
Edition. 63-80 
BayernLB set for €10bn bailout. Retrieved 2015, from 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41eb9908-bf01-11dd-ae63-
0000779fd18c.html#axzz3rvwmhnrn 
BayernLB, EU Commission Reach Accord on State-Aid Investigation. Retrieved 2015, 
from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-09/bayernlb-eu-
commission-reach-accord-on-state-aid-investigation 
Beefy Bail-Out: Lifeline of €30 Billion Thrown to BayernLB Bank - SPIEGEL ONLINE. 
Retrieved 2015, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/beefy-bail-
out-lifeline-of-30-billion-thrown-to-bayernlb-bank-a-593408.html 
Brückner, R., Lehmann, P., Schmidt, M. H., & Stehle, R. (2014). Fama/French factors for 
German: which set is best?. Retrieved from 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETI
NGS/2014-Rome/papers/EFMA2014_0446_fullpaper.pdf 
Domanski, D., Moessner, R., & Nelson, W. (2014). Central banks as lenders of last 
resort: experiences during the 2007-10 crisis and lessons for the future. BIS 
Working Papers, 79, 43–75. Retrieved from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014110pap.pdf 
German ELA in Crisis  Gillenwater 48 
 
Germany. FMSA. Overview of SoFFin Measures. FMSA, 2015. Web. 13 Oct. 2015. 
Götz, Martin R.; Haselmann, Rainer; Krahnen, Jan Pieter; Steffen, Sascha (2015) : Did 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of the ECB delay the bankruptcy of Greek 
banks?, SAFE Policy Letter, No. 46 
Rixtel, A. A. R. J. M. van, & Gasperini, G. (2013). Financial crises and bank funding: 
recent experience in the euro area. Basel: Bank for International Settlements, 
Monetary and Economic Dept. 
